Constitutional Preferences and Parliamentary Reform
9 Feb 2017
Oxford University Press
Politicians and academics often claim that the European Union is now so powerful that little is left to decide on for elected members of parliament. The reality, as this study shows, is more complicated as some countries afford parliamentarians more means to influence EU policy-making than others. They provide information to parliament on negotiations in 'Brussels' and they have procedures in place so that parliamentarians can participate in the formulation of the
country's negotiation goals and strategies. The existence of these rights is the result of the parliamentary traditions of a country, and of the reform choices of politicians with different ideas of
how the European Union should be organised. Therefore, critics cannot exclusively blame European integration for 'parliamentary deficits' that may exist in a country. They also have to hold national policy-makers to account for taking measures to make parliament 'fit' for European integration, or for deciding not to do so. This volume develops these arguments, contrasts them with the prevailing scholarly and political wisdom, and tests them empirically based on original
and comparative data covering all European Union member states.